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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the link between tight money policies and inflation in the spirit of
Sargent and Wallace's (1981) influential paper "Some Unpleasaiit Monetarist Arithmetic". A
standard neoclassical model with production, capital, bonds, and returii dominated currency
is used to study the long-run effects on inflation ofa tightening ofmonetary policy engineered
via a open market sale of bonds. The potential for tight money policies to .be inflationary
(unpleasant arithmetic) exists even when the real interest rate is below the growth rate of the
economy, and such equilibria can bestable. Incontrast, when moneta^policy isconducted viaa
fixed inflation-rate rule, the only stable equilibrium is theone that exhibits pleasant arithmetic.
The two monetary policy rules'therefore produce sharply different predictions about the likely
observability of unpleasant arithmetic in real world economies.
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1 Introduction
Standard conventional wisdom suggests that a tightening ofmonetary policy ought to be accom
panied by a reduction in inflation. There is even ample evidence, at least from highly inflationary
economies like Germany and Argentina in the post-war period, to support such a notion. A coun
terexample to this well-accepted lineof thinking is provided by Sargent and Wallace in their classic
paper "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic". In that paper, they show that in a standard
model where monetary pohcy cannot affect the fixed real interest rate, it is quite possible for a
tightening ofmonetary policy to precipitate an increase in inflation ("unpleasantmonetarist arith
metic"). This "spectacular" result is however predicated on the satisfaction of one crucial yet
controversial condition: the after-tax real rate of interest has to be higher than the real rate of
growth of the economy.
Subsequent to the publication of the Sargent and Wallace paper, a lively debate has ensued
in which a number of researchers have questioned the relevance of this condition for real world
economies, and have gone on toWonder ifunpleasant arithmetic is nothing but a theoretical curio-
sum. Darby (1984) and more recently, Espinosa and Russell (1998), have pointed out for example
that for post-war U.S, the after-tax real rate of return on government debt is close to zero and
that the real growth rate of GDP is over 3percent. The implication is clear: since we live in a low
real-interest-rate world, the only arithmetic we are likely to observe is of the "pleasant" variety.
This paper is part of a line of research dating back to Miller and Sargent (1984) and more recently,
Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998) and Espinosa and Russell (1999, 2001) that questions
this implication. At a broader level, it seeks to understand the long-run impact of monetary pol
icy on inflation in low real-interest-rate economies using amodel with neoclassical production and
capital mwhich money has real effects.^ Although these other papers have revealed the possibility
of obtaining unpleasant arithmetic in low interest economies when the marginal product of capital
is variable, ours is the flrst to focus on this case. In a sense, our paper is a direct descendant of
Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998) who delivered unpleasant arithmetic in a low real-rate
economy but with a fixed marginal product of capital.
To that end, we produce amodel that is ahybrid of Diamond (1965) and Wallace (1984). The
former component essentially allows us to replace the assumption of a linear production technology
in Sargent and Wallace (1981) with the assumption of a neoclassical production technology. As a
'Throughout the paper, we use the term "real interest rate" to signify the real return on one-period government
bonds, and not the real marginal product of capital.
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result, the,real interest rate is no longer fixed. The latter comporieiit permits us to study equilibria
where money is held even .when dominated by competing stores of \^ue. In our setup then, the
single final gopd may be used to purchase government bonds directly,or it may .be stored to yield
capital the following period. The, latter activity ris assumed to intermediated, and also subject'to
a standard currency reserve requirement. Capital dominates money in. rate of return. We focus
on equilibria where the reserve requirement binds. In such equilibria, bonds dominate monej^in
rate of return, and the marginal product-of capital, exceeds the re^ return on bonds. It remains
possible for the real rate, of return on-government bonds to stay below the long run real rate of
growth (unity in our case) of the economy. ^ .
Following Wallace (1984), we.^sume that the monetary authority chooses the bonds-money
ratio in the initial period and teps the ratio fixed.for all time. Chginges in this.bond-money ratio
may then be thought of as permanent openm^ket.operations. As in Wallace (1984), a tightening
of monetary policy therefore implies a permanent cut in this ratio. In such a world, and for fairly
general specifications of preferences and technology, we provide a complete characterization of the
necessary and sufficient conditions needed to, obtain unpleasant monetarist arithmetic in steady
states. In particular, we show if household saving is mildly sensitive to its return, then multiple
equilibria (with the same bondsTmoney ratio) are possible. At some of.these many equilibria, the
volume of seigniorage revenue the government collects .is increasing in the inflation rate. These
are the ones that are the most empirically relevant. At those •equilibria, tight money necessarily
reduces the capital stock, and niay even be inflationary. In particular, if the initial real interest rate
exceeds the growth rate of the,economy, then the unpleasant arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace
necessarily obtains. Recall that our principal focus is on equilibria with real interest rates below'
unity. We show that even in this case, unpleasant arithmetic remains a strong possibility.
Sharper results are .obtained when saying is return-invariant. In this case; there is a unique
monetary stationary equilibrium (if, any). At this equilibrium aji increase in the inflation rate
raises the volume of seigniorage revenues. rThis equilibrium may have an associatied reed interest
rate that is high or low. If the initial real interest rate is greater than unity, unpleasant arithmetic
holds. Even at the equilibrium with a real interest,rate, less than, unity, it is still possible for
unpleasant (and pleasant) arithmetic to be observed.^ Specializing to amodel economy with Cobb-
Douglas technology and logarithmic utility,,we go on to show that pleasant (unpleasant) arithmetic
This result has been obtained in slightly different environments by^Miller and Sargent. (1984), Bhattacharva.
Guzman, and Smith (1998), and Espinosa and Russell (1998, 1999).
is a strong possibility for low (high) values of monetary-policy tightness.^ Two additional points
deserve mention here. Unlike Bhattacharya, Guzman and Smith (1998), our results does not require
the marginal product ofcapital to exceed unity. Similarly, for tight money to be disinflationary,
unUke Wallace (1984), we do not requhre that the marginal product ofcapital beless than unity. ^
The paper closest in spurit and form to our current endeavour is Espinosa and Russell (2001).^
They consider a model that is almost identical to ours except for the following features. First, and
foremost, their specification of the monetary policy rule is different, more in line with other papers
in this tradition including Miller and Sargent (1984) and Sargent and Wallace (1981), as opposed
to Wallace (1984). Specifically, they assume that monetary policy is conducted by fixing the money
growth rate and allowing the bonds-money ratio to adjust accordingly. Second, our specification of
preferences and technology ismore general; they focus on return-invariant saving and Cobb-Douglas
technology throughout. Third, they use reserve requirements assumptions under which the return
rates on capital and bonds are equal and then introduce "capital intermediation costs" to create a
wedge between them. In contrast, we make assumption on reserve requirements that produce this
wedge without the need for such costs. The last two differences are possibly trivial enough, but not
the first.
Received wisdom from related overlapping generation models suggests that, under a fixed money
growth rule (as in Sargent, 1987), only the equilibria exhibiting pleasant arithmetic are dynamically
stable. Espinosa and Russell (2001) have confirmed this wisdom and gone on to raise concerns
about the actual observabiHty of stationary equilibria exhibiting unpleasant arithmetic. That is,
they have tried to rule out the possibility of observing unpleasant arithmetic on stability grounds.®
Our results indicate that under their assumptions on preferences, but with a fixed bonds-money
ratio rule, there is a unique low real-rate empirically relevant steady state that is dynamically
stable, and which exhibits unpleasant arithmetic. Under more general preference (and production)
assumptions, and under the fixed bonds-money ratio rule, all empirically relevant steady states are
dynamically approachable, including those exhibiting unpleasant arithmetic.''' The upshot is that
^In amodel without production and capital, Espinosa and Russell (1998) show that under low interest rates, a
small tightening of money is disinflationary if initially money is not too tight.
^In fact, pleasant arithmetic is not apossibility in Bhattacharya, Guzman and Smith (1998) under their assumption
that the real return to storage exceeds unity.
•"We thank two anonymous referees for drawing our attention to this paper.
Espinosa and Russell (2001) do not present a formal stability analysis in the more general return-dependent
saving case. Numerical experiments however indicate that their stability results are robust to this generalization.
With return dependent (invariant) saving, the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock is two (one)
dimensional. The "strong" dynamic stability of the unique steady state in the latter case is replaced by the "weaker"
dynamic approachability ofall steady states that empirically relevant
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if the fixed bonds-money ratio rule formulation is xealistic, then there is:no presumption in favor
of pleasant arithmetic steady states on stability grounds. . , . •'
To further facilitate comparison with Espinosa.and Russell (2001), we rework our model as
suming return-invariant saving but with a fixed .inflation rate policy rule.® By"means of numerical
examples we show that multiple monetary stationary equilibria-are now possible, and-these rnay
all have real interest rates less than unity. In the case there are exactly two equilibria,' the case
Espinosa and Russell focus on, we prove that the equilibrium with the lower (higher) interest rate
exhibits pleasant (unpleasant) arithmetic. Moreover, the equilibrium exhibitingpleasant arithmetic
is the only dynamically stable equilibrium. As such, just as Espinosa and Russell (2001) find; the
only arithmetic one is likely to observe is pleas^t.. • • >. -i ^ '
In sum, the different monetary policy rules studied here.produce sharply different predictions
about the likely observability of unpleasant arithmetic. With a fbced bonds-money ratio rule, and
return-inyariant saving, it is quite possible for a low re^-rate equilibrium to exhibit unpleasant
arithmetic and be dynamically stable. With a fixed.inflation rate rule, and return-invariant saving,
it is not possible for a low real-rate equilibrium to exhibit unpleasant arithmetic andbedynamically
stable. While om: result strengthens the case for the observability of unpleasant arithmetic, the
Espinosa and Russell result definitely weakens it.
Therestofthe paper isorganized as follows. Section 2describes themodel under a fixed bonds-
money ratio rule. Section 3 defines a monetary equilibrium and-,explores its properties: Section
4 sets out the main results concerning the long-run effects of open ,market operations. -(Section 5 '
sketches the model under a fixed inflation rate rule and establishes how the predictions for the
likely observability of unpleasant arithmetic differs "sharply across the two rules.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
We consider an economy consisting of an infinite sequence of tw^period lived overiapping genera
tions, an initial old generation, arid an infinitely-liW government. Let t = 1,2,... index time. At
each date t, a new generation comprised of Nidentical members appears.
There is asmgle final'good produced using ast'andard neoclassical production function F{Kt,^Lt)
®Espmosa and Russell (2001) study afixed-money-growth rule, not afixed-inflation rule. These rules are entirely
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where Kt denotes the capital input and Lj'denotes the labor input at t. Let kt = Kt/Lt denote
the capital-labor ratio (capital per young agent). Then, output per young agent at time t may be
expressed as f{kt) where /{kt}- = F(Kt/Lu 1) is the intensive production function. We assume that
/(O) = /' > 0> and that the usual Inada conditions hold. The final good can either be
consumed in the period it is produced, or it can be stored to yield capital the. following period. For
reasons of analytical tractability, capital is assumed to depreciate 100% between periods.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young, and is retired when old. In addition,
the initial old agents are each endowed with > 0units of fiat currency and ki > 0 units of
capital. , '
Let Cit (c2t) denote the consumption of the final good by a representative young (old) agent
born at t All such agents have preferences representable by the utility function U{cit,c2t) where
Uis twice-continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in its arguments.
Finally, the government has a constant net-of-interest deficit of p > 0 in each period. The
government does not levy any direct taxes and hence finances this every period entirely by issuing
bonds and money. Let Mt denote the per capita stock ofmoney outstanding at the end of period t,
and Bt denote the outstanding per capita supply of bonds (in nominal terms) where Mo =Bo =0.
2.2 Markets
Young agents supply their labor endowment inelastically in competitive labor markets, earning a
wage income oiwt at time t where
u)t = uj{kt) = f(kt) - ktS'{kt) Wt > 1.
(1)
In addition, capital is traded in competitive capital markets, and earns agross real return of qt+i
between t and £+ .1 where,
Qt+i = f'{kt+i). ^2)
It IS assumed that private agents do not have direct access to productive capital presumably because
of aminimmn size restriction as in Freeman (1987). They may hold either bank deposits. A, or -
government bonds, Bt, and the latter are not intermediated. Let p, denote the time t price level,
<1 denote the gross real interest rate on bank deposits, and be the gross real interest rate
on government bonds. Denote dt = Dt/Npt and bt = Bt/Npt.
Eachyoung agent® born at datei >.l chooses how much bondsand deposits to holdto maximize
C^(cit ,C24) subject to ... v. • '
cit + dtbt < ujt • • > ^3^
I ^ j -«
and
C2t $ ^+1^ +Pt+ih- (4)
For both bonds and deposits to be held, must hold. Let St = dt-i-bt denote savings of a
young agent. Then the agent's problem is simply to choose St to maximize U[a;(fct) - St, Pt+i^t -
Let "
S{u){kt),Pt+i) = argmax U - St.p^^^St] (5)
The function S summarizes, an agent's pptimd saving, behavior, .f
Atseveral points below, we will be assuming (for reasons :of analytical simplicity) that saving is
not too sensitive to a change in its return.. Formally-stated, we assume that the interest elasticity
of saving is less than.unity, or that^*^ , , . : .
5^1 <1. . . • (A.l)
We now turn to the determination of the interest on deposits (and bonds). As stated earlier,
♦ ' i ' t . , ' , I
private agents cannot access the capital production technology directly. Banks arise to perform
a simple intermediation function. They collect the individual deposits' from' all young agents and
invest it in the capital production .technology on their behalf. In return,- private'agents are promised
a competitive return of per unit deposited. We assume that banks are subject ,to a currency
reserve requirement in that for every unit of funds invested in the capital production technology,
they are required by law to hold a fixed fraction Aof that amount in the form of currency reserves.
That is, . . ' i
where-A G(0,1)..Let A:(+idenote capital, and mt denote real reserves. Then, the banks' balance
sheet requires + If •.../• - . - •
. '^ ^ ^^ (A.2)
following budget constraint; cso < giki +Mo/pi. Thus, at date 1, the initial old
agents receive capital income, Qtki, and nominal money, Mo, and they consume it all.
assumption solely to obtain sharper results. There is enough evidence to suggest
Kudoh empirically quite plausible. The consequences of abandoning this assumption are spelt out in
holds, then capital dominates money in rate ofreturn, and the reserve requirement (6) binds. In
passing, note that (A.2) also impHes that f'(kt+i) > Pt+i' Henceforth, we exclusively focus on
equilibria that satisfy (A.2).^^
Let Then <!> represents the fraction of deposits held in the form ofcapital, while (!-(/})
can be interpreted as the fraction ofdeposits required to be held as reserves. Then (1 - (p) may be
interpreted as a conventional reserve requirement. The real interest rate on bank deposits is then
given by a weighted sum of returns to capital and money, i.e.,
^ Pt
Pt+i —^Qt+i + (1— (7)
\Pt+i/
must hold. It follows that if (A.2) holds, then > ptipt+i holds too {i.e., in the equilibria
we consider, bonds always dominate money in rate of return). It is the presence of a binding
reserve requirement that creates a wedge between the return to capital and that on bonds.^^ Since
money pays no interest while bonds do, an open market purchase [i.e., selling more bonds) as an
mstrument ofdeficit finance essentially replaces a cheaper device with a more expensive one. We
explore the consequences of this observation below.
2.3 The Government
The government finances a constant net-of-interest deficit of p > 0 every period by issuing one-
period default-free bonds and by printing money The government's flow budget constraint is
Ptg ^Mt~ Mt-i + Si - ItBt-i, (8)
where h is the gross nominal interest rate on bonds. Equation (8) states that the government
finances its expenditures and interest obligations on outstanding government debt, from seignorage
revenue earned by money creation and from the sale of new bonds. Using rrit ~ Mt/Npu h =
It is important to note that fiat money is valued in this setup solely because of the presence of a reserve re
quirement. In other words, if money is dominated in return and no legal restrictions (e.g., reserve requirements) are
present, the demand for money would be zero. Since the current purpose is to study alternative modes ofdeficit
finance, we restrict our attention only on equilibria where a positive demand for money (reserves) exists.
In Espinosa and Russell (1999, 2001), capital intermediation costs creates a similar wedge between the return to
capital and the return to bonds. This particular difference between our models does not seem to create any major
qualitative difi'erences in the results.
and pt=rwe can rewrite (8) ...
g = mt~ - Pth-i 'it > 2. (9)
Following Sargent and Wallace (1981), we assume that the fiscal pthority in time 1chooses the
primary deficit g for all t and thatit is the monetary authority that is forced todesign its policies so
that (9) is satisfied each period.^"* Following Wallace (1984),^® Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith
(1998), among others, we assume that the treasury fixes at date 1the ratio of government debt to
money, /z, where
Vi>l. (10)
The central bank conducts its monetarypolicy by chan^ng the nominal money stock at all future
dates to ensure the ratio is always kept fixed at Henceforth, we will refer to this type of
monetary poUcy as a fixed bond-money ratio rule. It may be convenient to think, ofvariations in
Mas permanent open market operations. We will sometimes interpret ah increase in as a tight
money poHcy. Finally, at date 1, the central bank also sets the reserve requirement (1 —4))P
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Characterization ^ >
We begm by formally defining amonetary competitive equilibrium for our economy.
Definition 1Abinding mohetat^ equilibrium is aset of sequences for allocations {St}, {frj, {fcj,
{mt}, prices {gj, {wj, {pt}, {pj, and the initial conditions Mq >0, >6, Bo =0such that
(a) factor markets clear, i.e., (l)-(2) hold, (b) asset market clears: f kt+, ^bt^S
c) pt e9?++ for all t, (d) the government's budget constraints at date 1, p^g +Mq =Mj +Bj, and
at dates t > 1, i.e., (9) hold, and (e) .f >pi/ptU >0.
'^ Since Bo = 0, the government budget constraint at date 1is
„^ Ml Mo ^
which may be rewritten as p.j +Mo =M+B.. I„ equilibrium,,his pins down the initial price level
"-e central bank, see Barnett (2001)
nominal fLe b'^ ndrtVtrnLlrlrne'Tor ^
m^r '^^ otrbrdtectchll^^^ '-o central bank conducts
Noting that bt-\-dt~
4> ^t+ij we can rewrite the asset market clearing condition as
= <^>3 {uJ (kt), pt+i). (11)
The equilibrimn gross return on real balances (the inverse of the gross rate of inflation) for given <p
and g can now be determined as *
Pt-i _ (1 + f^)kt+i - fi(pktf{kt) -
Pt " [1-hjiil-mt
Substituting (12) in (7), it is possible to write (7) as
<i^ktf'{kt) + (1 —0)(1 + }i)kt+i —(ffg
(12)
[i+Mi-'jspi •
(13) describes the equilibrium rate of return on government bonds as a function of the capital-
labor ratio:- Therefore, (11) and (13), along with the restrictions embedded in Definition 1 jointly
constitute the equilibrium conditions for this economy. Together they determine the time path of
the capital-labor ratio, , given ki and the government's prior pre-committed choices of 0,
Ml, and g.
Note that morder to describe the entire price sequence it is necessary to pin down the
price level at date 1, which is an endogenous variable. The initial price level is given by
Ml
mi + bi-g'
where mi+6i = (1 +m) k2. Here, gis determined by the fiscal authority and Mi, the initial quantity
of money, is determined by themonetary authority.
3.2 Steady State Equilibria
We first explore the issue of existence of stationary equihbria. In a steady state, kt
Define ^ = 1+ (1 - (/>). Then we may rewrite (11) and (13) as
Ak = 4>S(u(k),p)
and
<f>p=p(fc) =i+^[m-i-|'
respectively. For future reference, note that
'<f>
= k holds.
(15)
(16)
(17)
and that p' (A;) < 0 holds for sufficiently small values of g.
Define Rm to be the stationary gross real return on money and tt ~ 1/^ to be the gross
inflation rate. Then, it follows from (12) that
^ = T -Jk
Combining (16) and (15) yields
k=^S{ui(k),p{k)) =^(k). • (19)
A '
The solutioh'tp (19) describes the steady state capital-labor ratio,' fc*, where'/:*'= (fc*). It is easy
to verify that in-a binding monetary'equilibrium,/c* must additionally satisfy ' '
1 'k <f(k') < -'f's' ' • • • ,20)
For future reference, denote the slope of the function Q(k) by 0 (fc). As we shall see below, the
size of©(k) is singularly important in- determining the properties of various equilibria.
It is easy to check that^® ^ '
®W =;^['S'"^ '^W+.V'W]- • - (21)
Figure 1 illustrates several configurations ofthe function Q{k). For g =' 0, Q(k) is concave and
strictly increasing in k. In this case, as is well-known, there is a unique steady state if k/u){k) is
increasing in k.^^ Similarly, if saving is return-invariant, i.e., Sp = 0, then there is necessarily an
unique equilibrium,(just as inEspinosa and'Russell (1999)).' Consider-'the more gerieral'case where
Sp > ,0 and p > 0. As g increases, Q,(k). shifts down in a' manner illustrated in Figure 1; multiple
steady state equilibria are easily possible here.-In contrast-with the standard Diamond'model with
fiat money however, not all candidate stationary equilibria-in our -model may satisfy (20).'
Lemma 1 Ifsaving is interest-invariant, then the steady state equilibHum k* is necessarily unique,
and is characterized by 0 (A:*) < 1. ^ saving is increasing in its return and p> 0, then an unique
equilibrium (characterized by 0 (fc*) ^ 1) is possible; similarly, multiple equilibria (characterized by
0 {k*) ^ 1) with the same bonds-money ratio is also possible.
(fc) maybe also be written as a combination of various elasticities
h w ^ if /(^) = (0,1). Howevl^r; for /(A:) specified a. in (24)below, k/ujik) IS decreasmg (increasing) in fc for small (I^ye) values of See von fhadden (1999) for details.
3.2.1 Examples
We now explore the issue of existence by means of some illustrative numerical examples.
1. Suppose the'production function and utility function is specified as follows:
f{k) = ak'' (22)
and
= + (23)
Suppose a = 0.33, </}• = 0.9, a = S, p = 0.96, 7 = 0.97, // = 12, and g = 1.66. Then, the unique
steady state capital stock is given by k* = 1.10. That is, even with return-dependent saving,
an unique steady state is possible.
2. Suppose we retain (23) but respecify the production function as follows:
/«= + - (24)
The parameters of the economy are as follows: ai = 0.11,02 = 0.25, /i = 0.57, g = 0,<f) = 0.65,
7 = 0.97, /? = 0.89, and 6 = —0.71. Under this choice of parameterization, it can be checked
that k* = 0.12 and k* = 0.31 are the two steady states.
3.3 Seigniorage
The government's ability to make use ofcurrency and (possibly) bond seigniorage to raise revenue
obviously faces certain endogenous restrictions. In particular, theremay arise a tension between the
inflation tax base and the inflation tax ratewhen it comes to raising a fixed amount ofseigniorage.
We turn to these issues below. First, we compute the total seigniorage raised in steady states, in
the economy. From (9), it follows that the total seigniorage collected at a steady state k' is given
by
^ k; fi) = Xk 1+ n—ARm — {k*) . (25)
Substitute (7) into (15) to obtain
Ak- = 4,3 [c^(fc-), <(,/' {k') + (26)
which describes the relationship between k' and R^, for given /i. Prom (26), it is easy to show that
^ ^ A[l-e{k')] + <t>lp'{k')-4>f"{k')\S,
dk'
From (27), it is then appai^ent that if ©(/:5) <.l holds, then dlirnldk* < 0 holds at.any 'A:*, given
Thus, for given /z, (26) implicitly defines k* =• h (Rm'i y)-, where h' (i?,^;v) >' 0 if 0'(A:'): <• 1.
Then, we substitute k* = h {Rm\ y) into (25) to obtain the expression for total seigniorage:
H{Rm\^i) = H{Ilfn,h{Ilm\^i)\fi) = \h{Rfn\fi)[l-\-^-ARm-^<i>f'(h{Rjn\y))\. (28)
The right hand side of (??) is the conventional total seigniorage Laifer curve (drawn- wuth the
stationary return to money on the horizontal axis). '^^ For future reference, a steady state k* is
henceforth described'to be on the "gobd side" of the total seigniorage Lsiffer curve if an increase in
the inflation rate necessarily raises the volume of seigniorage revenue at that steady state.
Proposition 1 On the (H, Rm) space, a steady state k* is on the "good'side" of the total seignior
age Laffer curve, i.e., (dH (Rm', /^) /dRm < 0) holds if and only if B(k*) < 1.
Proposition 1 implies that an-increase in the inflation rate necessarily raises the volume of
seigniorage revenue only when 0 (ft*) 1 obtains. They are also the onesrthat are regarded widely
as being themost empirically'realistic because ofthe underlying relationship between the inflation
rate and seigniorage revenue. With return-invariant; saving, there is a unique steady state, and
the seigniorage Laifer curve has only one side, the "good side". The intuition for this result is as
i •• • u - ' " ' 'follows. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the inflation rate, given a fixed inflation tax base (as is the
case under return-invariant saving), increases currency seigniorage. At the s^e time, it reduces
the overall return.on bank deposits and hence, .the return-on government bonds. This fall in the
interest rate on bonds reduces-the government's interest expense. The overall effect is that the
government's combined revenue rises.' • • '' i '
Henceforth, we focus our attention only on those equilibria that are on the "good side" of the
seigniorage"Laffer curve. That is, wewill niaintain that
Assumption 1 Q (k*) < -l holds. - • ' ' '
3.4 Bond Seigniorage
In our analysis, the real interest rate is endogenous and may be greater or less than the growth
rate of the economy. Equilibrium bond holdings are also endogenous. As sucK, the, revenue from
"This IS by no means the only way to draw aLaffer curve. Espinosa ahd Russell (2001) draw Laffer curves with
the real interest rate oil the horizontal axis while others present.them with the inflation rate on the horizontal axis.
Our formulation follows Sargent (1987).
the sale of bonds may go up or down when the interest rate changes. The revenue from the sale of
bonds in steady states is given by .
Sb^b(p) (l~p) = fi\k{l~p(k)). (29)
For future reference, we collect some information about the volume of bond seigniorage in this
economy in the lemma below.
Lemma 2 a) At steady state k*, the volume of bond seigniorage decreases with an increase in the
interest rate on bonds if and only if
l-p(r)
k*p' (k*)
b) Define
^ 1. (30)
For small g, T {k*) < 0 holds. If p <1 holds at a steady state k*, then
3.5 Dynamic Properties of Equilibria
As is clear from Lemma 1 above, multiple stationary equilibria are possible in our model. As such,
it becomes crucial to know which steady state a particular economy is going to approach, given
an arbitrary initial capital-labor ratio, k\. In the appendix, we prove the following proposition
describing the local stability properties ofthe stationary equilibria.
Proposition 2 Suppose saving is return-dependent Then it is possible that multiple stationary
equilibria (some characterized by 0 (k*) < 1and others characterized by e {k*) > 1) exist Of these,
only the equilibria characterized by Q{k*) < 1 are saddles. Those characterized by 0(fc*) > 1 are
likely to be sources. If however, with return-dependent saving, there is an unique equilibrium and
0 {k*) < 1 obtains at that equilibrium, then it is a saddle.
Corollary 1 If saving is return-invariant, k* is unique and stable.
'^It IS not possible to prove in general that with return-dependent saving, equilibria with ©(fc') >1are sources
(they cannot be sinl^, for sure). Two comments are in order here. -First, it seems that for valid equilibria with
©(fc*) > 1 to exist, it is necessary thatk/uj{k) be decreasing in k somewhere. Aproduction function that satisfies
this condition is (24). Second, using this production function and (23) where (3 € (0,1) and 7€ (0,1), Bhattacharya
(1996) proves that 4> > and 7€(0.5,1] are suffici^l; to ensure that equilibria with 0(fc') >1are sources.
Under return-dependent saving, ste^y states that' have ©(k*) < 1 are unstable in the sense
that they cannot be approached from an; arbitrary set of initial, conditions. However, they are
approachable from correctly chosen initial.conditions that place the economy on the stable manifold
or the saddle path. In, this sense, steady states under return-dependent:saving characterized by
. 0 (k*) < 1 are potentially d3Tiamically, approachable even though they are unstable. We think
of "dynamic approachabihty" as a "weaker" notion of stability.. For future reference, note that if
saving is interest?invariant, then there is always ^ unique equilibrium, and it is necessarily stable.
For future reference, let us collect all our results in one place here.' Thus far, we" have shown
that if monetary policy is conducted using a fixedvbonds-money rule, and saving is return-invariant,
then there is an unique dynamically stable" long-run equilibrium. At that equilibrium, increasing
the moneygrowth rate always-raises revenue (across steady states) for the government.- If saving is
return-dependent, and we restrict ourselves to equilibria where an increase in the inflation-rate nec
essarily raises seigniorage revenue, then only, these equilibria (possibly one) are the only potentially
dynamically approachable ones. •
4 Open Market Operations
Following Sargent and Wallace (1981), Wallace (i984) and Espinosa and Russell (1999), we now
investigate how changes in the bond-money ratio, /i, affect the steady state equilibrium levels of
the rate of inflation. As stated earlier, an increase in corresponds to a contractionary (and
permanent) open market operation. In other words, tight money policies involve increases in /z.
First, we investigate the effects of a change in fi on the steady state capital stock. Notice that
(19) gives the.relationship between k* and.yx," that is-independent of Then,' using (19), 'it is
easily esta,blished that
> - dk* j (1 - - 1) - l) A:* • - •
dfi " >l[l-0(^'*)] •
Lemma 3 Under Assumption (A.l), dk/dii <0ai a steady state characterized by ©(k*) < 1.
* >
This result is crucial to much of what follows. What it says is that ifmonetary policy .is" con
ducted using afixed bond^money rule, and saving is relatively insensitive to its return (Assumption
A.l), then at any steady state on the good side of the total seigniorage Laffer curve, amarginal
foreshadow, mSection 5below, we show that were the central bank to follow afixed inflation rate rule instead,
then even with return-invariant saving and reasonable looking parameters, there are two steady states, one stable
and the other unstable (though both are potentially dynamically approachable).
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tightening of monetary policy reduces the long-run capital stock. Two effects are at work here.
When the treasury increases the supply of bonds, agents buy up this debt only at a higher promised
return on bonds. With return-invariant saving, a shift towards more bonds in private portfolios
causes bank deposits get crowded out. At a given return on money, the bank is forced to lower its
capital holdings (because of the reserve requirement) in order to raise the" return on deposits so as
to match up with the new higher return on bonds.
To study the effects of a marginal tightening on the steady state rate of inflation, transform
(18) into an expression for the steady state inflation rate:
[1 + /X (1 - .;6)] k
(1 +/i)A; - - -j^g
Ata steady state k* characterized by 0 (A:*) < 1, (32) implicitly defines k* = x (fi),where x' (//) < 0.
Substitute k* = x {y) into (33a) to obtain
, = 1+ ^ . (34)
(1 + m) - (m)) -
Equation (34) gives us an expression for the gross inflation rate as a function of /z, provided that
k' is approachable. Then, the eff'ect of an increase in ^ on the inflation rate is captured by:
r. . •• (33a)
d/i
Ax' (^)
2
Using (32), and Lemma 2, we can simplify (35) to:
(35)
• = + , (36)
For sufficiently small values ofg, we know from Lemma 2 that r{k*) < 0 holds. It follows then
that the sign of ^ crucially depends on whether the initial real interest rate, p^l and on the sign
of (which in turn, is naturally connected to the stabiUty properties ofk*).
Proposition 3 Consider a steady state k* characterized by 0 {k') < 1. At that steady state, (a) if
p > I, then dTrjdp, > 0 for all (h) if p <\, then dirfdfj. may be either positive or negative.
Corollary 2 Consider a steady state k' characterized by Q(k*) <1. At that steady state, suppose
p < I. Then, a tight money policy engineered by a permanent open market operation raises the
steady state inflation rate if and only if
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Part (a) of Proposition 3 has a strong intuitive appeal. If .the.return on igovernment,bonds
exceeds the growth .rate of the economy (here-unity), and saving is relatively:'insensitive to its
return, then all equilibria on the good side of the seigniorage La#er curve (which are also potentially
dynamically approachable) .will exhibit unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. The intuition-is clear.
Suppose the treasuiy conducts an open market sale, of new bonds.-If the initial promised return
on these bonds exceeds the growth rate of the economy, then, interest, payments on,, outstanding
debt will eventually outstrip the revenue from the fresh^s^e of'these new bonds. The central bank
eventually will have to, oblige by printing money to cover the shortfall. It will succeed in its .efforts
only on the good side of the total seigniprage-L^er curve.' Part (a) of Proposition 3 therefore
extends Sargent and Wallace's (1981) classic result on unpleasant monetarist arithmetic to fairly
general neoclassical economies, of the Diamond (1965) variety.w^ .
Since the publication of the Sargent and Wallace paper, a number, of.authors have cast doubts
on the applicability of the unpleasant, ^ithmetic by questioning whether the 'condition that real
interest rates have to.be higher than the growth rate of the economy hold for real-world economies.
Darby (1984), and more recently, Espinosa and Russell (1998), have pointed out that for example
that for post-war U.S., the„after-tax real rate^of return on government debt is near zero, while
the average real growth rate of GDP has been around 3%. Miller and Sargent (1984) and later
Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998);went on,to consider the possibility of resurrecting the
unpleasant arithmetic by weakening the ,unre^stic:high real rate condition. Part (b) of Proposition
3is in that vein. It states that even if the return on bonds is less than the growth rate of the economy,
it is still possible that a tight money policy may raise the long-run, inflation rate. It bears emphasis
here that if permanent open market operations have,no real effects, i.e., = 0obtains, then the
necessary and sufficient condition for unpleasant arithmetic to hold wbuld he p>l. Therefore, in
order to produce acondition for the unpleasant arithmetic.thatjs weaker than the Sargent-Wallace'
condition, it is necessary that the. government's open,market activity has real'effects! FVom (32), it
is clear that the presence of a unremovable reserve requirement, is necessary for this to happen. In
effect then, any weakening of the Sargent-Wallace condition that is achieved in the present paper
is entirely attributable to this binding reserve requirement. ^
The intuition for Part (b) of Proposition 3is as follows. When p<1obtains, the government
raises apositive revenue from the sale of bonds. The question is whether following an. open market
Bhattacharya (1996; Chapter 4) shows a similar result for an identical model with CRRA utility and CES
preferences."
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sale of debt, this bond seigniorage is large enough to finance the government's primary deficit
without eventually necessitating anincrease in currency seigniorage. Suppose, as in theexperiment
ofProposition 3 that the government sells new debt. On the one hand, this directly increases the
bond seigniorage 6(1 - p); this is the "tax base effect"ofEspinosa and Russell (1998). On the other
hand, for reasons discussedearUer, this reduces the capital stock, and in turn increases the interest
rate, which reduces the volume of bond seigniorage (the "tax rate effect" of Espinosa and Russell,
1998). On net, the latter effect outweighs the former. Additionally, the crowding out of capital
reduces reserves, and hence reduces the inflation tax base. As such, on the good side of the total
seigniorage Laffer curve, the central bank still has to make up the shortfall by raising the inflation
rate.^"^ ^
Corollary 2attempts tosomewhat sharpen the requirements for obtaining unpleasant arithmetic
in the case when p< 1obtains. Notice that for small g, we know from Lemma 2that F(A;*) < 0
holds. We also know from Lemma 2that T(k*) < 0impHes that the volume of bond seigniorage
decreases with an increase in the bond interest rate at such asteady state. Additionally, since we are
focusing our attention only on dynamically approachable steady states, it follows from Proposition
3 that < 0holds. Then, it is clear that the necessary and sufficient condition for unpleasant
arithmetic is the one spelt out in Corollary 2.
It is useful to collect all the qualifiers needed to obtain unpleasant arithmetic in an economy
where the real interest rate is below its growth rate. First, it is necessary that monetary policy
has real effects; additionally, amarginal tightening of the monetary poficy must reduce the capital
stock. Without this, unpleasant arithmetic is obtained only if the real rate of return on bonds
exceeds the growth rate of an economy. The next qualifier is that a higher interest rate on bonds
reduces bond seigniorage. There are two additional effects to consider. One is that a tight money
pohcy (higher refiance on bonds) increases bond seigniorage. The other is that, the tight money
policy reduces the capital stock, raises the return on bonds, and thereby reduces bond seigniorage.
The final qualifier needed is that the latter effect exceeds the former, which is the condition in
Corollary 2. In plain English, this last condition requires the economy to be on the "bad" side of
a bond-seigniorage Laffer curve (see (29)) drawn on the isb,ii) space.^^ Parenthetically, it can be
Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998) use amodel similar to the one presented here to show that unpleasant
arithmetic may hold in an economy with p< 1. The difference is that they use an endowment economy, while we
work with a Diamond (1965) economy. The driving force of their result is the "tax base effect". Our structure allows
a flexible return on capital and hence produces, in addition, a "tax rate effect" which reduces bond seigniorage (as
well as currency seigniorage).
"At such an equilibrium, a tightening of monetary policy (sale of bonds) causes the steady state revenue from
bonds to fall. This case has been extensively studied in E^inosa and Russell (2001).
.noted that a necessary condition required to" obt^'pleasant''arithmetic when p < 1 is'that the
economy-to-be on.the "good" side of a bond-sd^orage Laffer cuiVe drawn on'the (sfr, //) space.
This is exactly the type, of condition that Miller arid 'Sargent (1984) had in mind. •' '
It seems possible that the effect on the'inflation rate of a marginal tightening of monetary
policy may therefore depend on the existing extent'of monetary policy tightness. The next lemma
formalizes all this. . . •
Lemma 4 Define ft to be the solution to (1+ p,)k (p,) —p,4>k (jj) f{k (/i)) = Then, at a steady
state characterized by © (A*) < I and /? < 1, for sufficiently small g,
and
1.
hm < 0
dfi
lim — > 0
dfj,
holds, where ^ is derived from (36). In other words, pleasant arithmetic obtains only for sufficiently
low values of the bonds-money ratio. . . ; : ' '
How does our'result compare to the one present^ in Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998).
The crucial difference between our two models is that by virtue of their assumption of a linear-
storage saving technolo^, the real interest rate is fixed. The driving force of their result is then
the tax base effect"of Espinosa and Russell (1998). A higher bond-money ratio through open
market operations crowds out deposits from the portfolio of private agents. This reduction in
deposits causes a reduction in the volume of reserves held by banks. Consequently, the inflation
tax base falls forcing the central bank to reuse the inflation rate. .In,contrast, in our Diamond
(1965) economy, an additional "interest rate effect" emerges, and this effect which is necessarily
absent,in .the Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998) framework, may reduce the volume of bond
seigniorage (as well as currency seigniorage).
Datmgback to Wallace (1984); rese^chers have studied'the connection between the pleasantness
of the arithmetic andHhe initial marginal product of capital at the_equilibrium being studied. In
this context, notice that in our model, as is clear'from (16), when,^ > 0holds,./'(^) > 1does
not necessarily imply that p> 1holds. Thus Part (b) of Proposition 3proves that,it is.possible'
for tight money to have inflationary conWquences even when the return on bonds is lower and the
margmal product of capital is higher than the growth rate of the economy. '^^ This has two important
"For example, consider the specification of preference^gnd technology as described in Section 4.1 below. Let the
implications. One is that in contrast to Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998), f{k) > 1 is
not required for tight money to be inflationaiy. In words, the marginal product of capital being
greater than the growth rate is not necessary to obtaining unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. The
other implication is that / (^) < 1is not required for tight money to be disinflationary.^^ That is,
for tight money to reduce the long-run inflation rate, it is not necessary that .the marginal product
of capital be less than the growth rate of the economy.
How does our result compare with those in Espinosa and Russell (1999, 2001)? Recall that
Espinosa and Russell consider an alternative policy rule. In their setup, the central bank changes
the money growth rate so as to satisfy the Treasury's target level of the bond-money ratio. In
the section ahead, we consider a model that is identical to the one described above except that
the monetary policy rule is almost identical to the one discussed in Espinosa and Russell. To
foreshadow, what Espinosa and Russell (and we will) find is that with return-invariant saving, in
cases where there are multiple (two) equihbria, and both the equilibria are characterized by real
interest rates that are less than unity, it is the low (high) real-rate equilibrium that is dynamically
stable (unstable) and exhibits pleasant (unpleasant) arithmetic, even though both are dynamically
approachable. Since real interest rates in most real world economies are quite low, their result has
the implication that the only equilibrium one can hope to observe in the real world will exhibit
pleasant arithmetic. In other words, they rule out the possibility of unpleasant arithmetic on
stability grounds. In sharp contrast, Proposition 3 along with Proposition 2suggests that with
return-invariant saving, an equiHbrium with a low real interest rate, and which exhibits unpleasant
arithmetic is stable, and hence potentially observable in the real world.
4.1 An example with return-invariant saving
In this subsection, we illustrate some of our main results thus far by focussing on an example with
return-invariant saving. This will also facihtate the comparison with results obtained by Espinosa
and Russell (1999) and others in the hterature. We use the following specification: C/(ci,C2) =
Inci -H/3Inc2, which (using (5)} implies that S = pu; (k) /I + /3 = su; (k). Furthermore, assume
parameters of the economy be given by f{k) = 0= 0.97, g= 0.03, s = 0.55. Then, for ^ = 0.2, there is a
unique steady state defined by k' = 1.63, = 0.98 and = l.Oi. At this steady state, an increase in increases
the mnation rate.
"In Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998), as in Wallace (1984) and others, tight money is necessarily disin-
Hationary if the marginal product of capital is below unity.
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f{k) = ak°'j.a ^ (0,1). Prom (19), it follows then that i
s<l>a (1 —a) l-a
[l=+M(l-'';i)J •
and therefore that k* is unique. Also /9(fc*) g 1 is possible. The lawof niotion for the capital'stock
is given by " ' ^ "
W+i
.. s4>a{l-a)kf.
Kij.^ =
from where it is clear that k* is stable since =a € (0,1). It is easyjto check that ^ <0
holds. The steady state inflation rate (using (??))
• ^(/i) = ..[l+,/^(l-^)] • - , . •
Example 1 Let the parameters of the economy he given by f{k) = = 0.97, g = 0.03,
s = 0.7. Then, for fj, = 1.1, there is a unique steady state, k" = 2.28.^® As illustrated in Figure 2, a
tight money policy engineered by an increase in the bonds-money j^atio causes the inflation'rate to
fall in the range /z 6 (0,4) and causes it to rise thereafter.
4.1.1 Transitional Dynamics
In this subsection, ,we study the behavior of inflation and the real interest rate on the transition
path from one steadystate to another bymeans ofnumerical experiments. The basic ideaof these
experiments is as follows. Take a set ofparameters (including the bond-money ratio) and flnd a
unique monetary stationary equiHbrium. Then set the stationary capital-labor ratio as the initial
condition, and change the bonds-money ratio at date 1. Then keep track of the time paths for key
endogenous variables. '
The first example is intended to replicate Sargent and Wallace's (1981) unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic: The parameters for this example are: 0 = 0.9, a = 0.2, a = 2, ^ = 0.97, g = 0.01,
Ml = 1. Initially set fj, = 9. Under these specifications, there is a unique monetary steady state
equilibrium given by k* = 0.29, p* = 1.02, and tt* =' 1.88. Now raise fx from' 9to 10, given
ki = k* = 0.29 and Mi = 1as the initial conditions. The results are reported in Figures 3a. As is
evident, kdecreases over time, and pincreases over time without a jump. Since we assume 100%
depreciation, these'transition paths are rather rapll Since p>1, bond seigniorage is negative for
aU t. Note that the inflation rate jumps up at the time the new poHcy is implemented, and then
28Similarly, for n = 7.12, there isa unique steady state, ib* =-1.78.
21
it declines over time until it reaches the new steady state; At the new steady state, k* = 0.27
P" —1-04, and tt* = 3.87. The initial price level can be computed os pi —3,08.
The next example is intended to explore the possibility ofobtaining pleasant arithmetic in low
real-interest rate economies. The parameters chosen are; 4> = 0.9, a = 0.2, a = 5, /? = 1, ^= 0.2.
The initial value of /£ is 2 and Mi = 1. Figures 3b shows the case where /i increases from 2 to
3 while Figure 3c presents the case where // increases from 5 to As suggested by Lemma 4.
pleasant arithmetic obtains for these low (2 to 3) values of //. Note that the gross inflation rate
decreases monotonically along the transition path, and bond seigniorage is positive at all dates.
According to Figure 3c, however, as p increases from 5 to 6, the inflation rate starts to rise. This
is an illustration of unpleasant arithmetic in low real interest rate economies. The behavior of the
inflation rate is similar to theone for high interest rates; inflation jumps up and then declines over
time.
5 Fixed inflation rate rules
Thus far, we have considered a setup where the government conducts monetary poHcy by fixing
the bonds-money ratio at the start of time and then choosing a nominal money stock then and
all future dates that is consistent with its choice of the bonds-money ratio. In short, the principal
instrument of monetary poUcy was the bonds-money ratio. Under this fixed bonds-money ratio
rule, we derived the following result. If saving is return-invariant, then there is aunique monetary
stationary equilibrium (if any) and it is dynamically stable. If the initial real interest rate is greater
than unity, unpleasant arithmetic is observed. If the real interest rate is less than unity at that
steady state, itis still possible for unpleasant arithmetic to be observed. Thus, real world economies
that have low real interest rates may observe unpleasant arithmetic. This section examines the sharp
contrast between this result and that obtained in another version of the model that is virtually
identical to this one except that the monetary pohcy rule is different. In particular, we consider
an alternative rule wherein the government fixes the inflation rate at date 1and allows the bonds-
money ratio to adjust gradually to its new level This is very similar to the constant money growth
rate pohcy rule described in Espinosa and Russell (2001). As they show, and we confirm, this
change in the rule is enough to produce the prediction that the only arithmetic one would observe
in low real-rate economies is of the pleasant type. For sake of brevity, we briefly sketch the model
A*-^1 2fi 7- '^ n'fin ^ and tt" =1.53. For /i =5.k 1. 6, p = 0.80, and tt = 1.84. For ^ = 6, A:' = 1.16, p' = 0.84, and tt' = 248
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and the main results below, and.relegate inost of the details-to Bhattacharya and Kudoh (2001).
As stated,above,; the model presented belowis identical to the one"'presented thus far except
for. the specification .of monetary policy. -Specifically, ^suine that the monetary authority sets the
inflation rate at date 1, • • • . • '
^ . • —•=n>L Vt>.l : (37)
Vt ~ ~
and implements it by changing the money growth rate according to
Mt Mt/pt Pt . m kt+1
where the last equality uses (6) at equality. Note that in a.steady state equilibrium (and not
Otherwise), this inflation setting rule is identical to the constant money growth rule adopted in
Espinosa and Russell (2001).
For ease of comp^isoii, we' tbo assume thatsaving is'return-invariant.' That is, S {uf{kt) ,Pt+i) =
suj {kt) where 's = e (0; 1). Then, a binding monetary competitive equilibriiim of this economy
[using (7)', (11) and (9)] is characterized by:' • - • ' ' • " . '
mt + kt+i-\- bt = suj{kt) , (39)
^ <l>f{kt+i)-\- ' (40)
9 = mt -—mt-i-hbt —pth-i, (41)
, I < f'H • ^ I, *
and'(38). Substitute (38) into (39) to obtain
6t =s.a;(/c()-^A:(+i- . , (42)
T• <P.
Substitute (39) and (40) into (41) to obtain
_ 1 - 0, ,1 , ,g.- ^ kt^,--—kt +bt-
n
Analogous to (11) and (13), equations (42) and (43) jointly constitute the equilibrium conditions
. ' , -il'* I' ' ' '
for this economy.
l' •'in
In a steady state, (42) impHes
b=:S.uj(:k)-.~h=B{k) • • (44)
and (43) may be rearranged to yield
9-{i-h)^k- ••
bt-i. (43)
Avalid monetary competitive equilibrium is a solution to (44) and (45) that satisfy 6> 0, /fe > 0, and
f'{k) > ^. We are principally interested in solutions where p<l obtains. Several configurations of
the intersection ofthe b= •5(A:) and the b= '^ (k) loci are possible; we are particularly interested
in the configuration illustrated in Figure 4. Small values of the reserve requirement, intermediate
values of the government deficit and the savings rate are conducive to producing this particular
configuration.
Example 2 Let the •parameters of the economy be given by U = 1.3, f{k) = 4A:°-^5, (p = 0.97,
g = 0.03, and S = sw{k) where s = 0.7. Then, there are exactly two valid steady states; the high
capital steady state has kh = 2.28 {pi = 0.81) and the low one has k[ = 1.78 = 0.95). The
situation is illustrated in Figure 5.
It is important to note that the parameters ofthe economy outlined in Example 2 produce two
values of the long-run bonds-money ratio (// = 7.11 and = 1.1). The latter coincides with the
unique equiUbrium presented in Example 1. In other words, a fixed money-growth rule does not
uniquely define a equilibrium value for the bonds-money ratio. In general, it is the case that a
fixed inflation rate or money-growth rule can easily produce multiple equilibria even with return
invariant saving. This possibility does not exist with a fixed bonds-money ratio rule as we have
seen in Section 4.1.
Having characterized the stationary equilibria, we now ask the question; what happens to real
interest rates when the government follows a tight money policy? In the present setup, a tight
money policy would imply a cut in the inflation rate at all dates. Again, the reason for this focus is
the ease of comparison with the results in Espinosa and Russell (1999, 2001). In their terminology,
the conventional wisdom is that of pleasant arithmetic which, under a fixed inflation rate rule, may
be characterized as tight money policies causing the real interest rate to rise. Then, unpleasant
arithmetic would naturally be defined as a situation where tight money policies precipitate a fall
in the real interest rate. What Espinosa and Russell find is that in situations where there are two
stationary equilibria both with low (less than unity) real interest rates, the one with the lower
(higher) interest rate exhibits pleasant (unpleasant) arithmetic. Not surprisingly, given the ample
similarity between this current setup and their paper, we find the same result which we simply
state here for completeness.
Lemma 5 Amarginal tightening of the monetary policy achieved via a cut in the inflation rate
causes the real interest rate to rise (fall) at pi (p^^. In other words, amarginal tightening produces
pleasant arithmetic at the low real-rate equilibrium andproduces unpleasant arithmetic' at the fiigh
real-rate equilibrium. , • r,,
As an illustration,, consider the situation described in Example 2. If, ceterisparlbu's, 11 is cut
, to 1.2, it is e^ily verified thatfalls to-<0.94 and.rises to 0.83.
Finally, we undertake, a quick study of.the local stability properties'of the two steady state
equilibria. Recall, that the laws of motion are givisn by'(42) and (43). Then, linearizing around a
steady state (k*, b*) yiel(k the Jacobian matrix J.. i " • •. •
J(r,6*) =
1,
\ <t>
\
^ +<l,r(U')b'\+su'{k'y " -p'^
+'^ /" (k-) 6-] su>' (k') • f ;
A very likely scenario is the combination of a saddle and'a sink ^ 'is illustrated in the example
below. ' ' . ' ' • " * .
I. _ 1 .. ' ' - • ' ,
Example 3 Let the parameters of the economy be the same as in Example 2 above. There are
exactly two steady states, the high capital steady state has kh = 2.28 (pi = 0.81) and the low one
has ki = 1.78 = 0.95). Then,
, / .61965 -.9566 "^
'^ {Ph) =
\ -.20093 .98619
holds, with associated eigenroots 0.32774 and 1.2781 (indicating that is a saddle). Similarly,
^ _ Q1«70 \
J{Pl) =
/
.37445 -.816 72
-1.3753 X 10-2 .84198
with associated eigenroots 0.35154, and 0.86488 (indicating that pi is a sink). Hence the configu
ration is exactly as described in the phase diagram illustrated in Figure 6.
In other words, as is the case in Espinosa and Russell (1999), the low real rate equilibrium
IS dynamically stable while the higher red.rate equilibrium is not (it is potentially dynamically
approachable though). In conjunction with Lemma 5, it follows that the equilibrium exhibiting
pleasant arithmetic is the only dynamically stable equilibrium. It is this last observation that
Espinosa and Russell (2001) use to make the argument that real world economies with low real
interest rates are likely to exhibit only pleasant arithmetic.^^
the central bank is following afixed- inflation rate rule, then it does not know which time path for k(and other
real variables) to expect, because there is no unique path toward asteady state if it is asink. But when it tries to
Ughten money, it is sure that pleasant arithmetic will obtain. On the other hand, if the central bank follows afixed
f 7 equilibrium path to the steady state since it is a saddle, but then it
h ^ arithmetic will obtain. This would be another way of characterizing thedifferences between our result and those obtained in Esp^sa a d Russell (2001).
/
5.1 Remarks
Aquick consolidation of our results thus far and comparison across the two monetary policy rules
is in order here. Consider the fixed bonds-money ratio rule version of our model. There we show
the following. Ifsaving is return-invariant, then there is a unique monetary stationary equiUbrium
(if any) and it is dynamically stable. Ifthe initial real interest rate is greater than unity, unpleasant
arithmetic is observed. If, as is the case in real world economies, the real interest rate is less than
unity at that steady state, it is still possible for unpleasant arithmetic to be observed. That is, it
is not possible to rule out unpleasant arithmetic in real world economies on stability grounds. Now
consider the fixed inflation rate rule version of the model presented in Section 5. There we show
the following. If saving is return-invariant, then there is likely to be multiple monetary stationary
equilibria (if any) and these may all have real interest rates less than unity. The equiUbrium
with the lower (higher) interest rate exhibits pleasant (unpleasant) arithmetic. Moreover, the
equilibrium exhibiting pleasant arithmetic is the only dynamically stable equilibrium. As such, it
is possible to rule out unpleasant arithmetic in real world economies on stability grounds. The two
monetary policy rules therefore produce sharply different predictions about the likely observability
of unpleasant arithmetic.
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Appendix .
A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof readily follows from arguments that are-standard'and presented in detail in Galor and
Ryder (1989). Also see Figure 1. •
B Proof of Proposition 1 .
Differentiate (28) with respect to Rm to^obtain
dH\
dUm
|-A^#/"(A:) h'{Rrn\tj)-XkA, (46)
where we have used (25) to write A[1 + A* - AHm - (A:)] = g/k. Substituting (27) into (46),
we have
dH
dRm ^ (1 0 {k)) + 4> [pf (k) - (}>!" (k)] s.
Thus, dHjdlUn < 0 if ,
-\kA.
XkA^ (1-0 {k)) >[| - (A:)] (1 - ^) 5^ - [p' {k) _ (fc)] <l,XkASp =0, (47)
. ' - . V I
where we have substituted (17) into the right-hand-side of (47). This proves that at asteady state
characterized by ©(^) < 1, < 0 at that steady state.' " ' . ^ '
C Proof of Lemma 2
a)-It is easily ekablished (using (29)) that'
dp ^ y p'{k')
Then the rest is immediate.
b) For small g, p' (k') <0holds and hence T(fc*) <0holds. Substitute (17) into the expression
for r (A:*) to get the desired result.
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D Proof of Proposition 2
To study the local dynamical properties of this system, we linearize the system of nonlinear
difference equations (11) and (13) around a steady state. First, to reduce notation we define
^ (k, p) =Ap- (jif [k] - (l>kf" (k). Notice that since p= (k) +(1 - «>) in abinding steady
state,
iP {k, p) = ix{l-<p) <pf' (k) + (1 - 0) AJR^ ~ (j>kf" (k) > 0.
Local dynamics of the system is described by the linear difference equations, Xzt+\ == Kzi,where
/
X =
A ~4>Sp
(1 - (i>) (1 + /i) 0 y
\
, =
^ (PS^w'ik) 0 ^
fik,p) Ak)
The mverse of matrix Xexists if Sp >0. Then, we obtain zt+i = (X-^Y) zt = Jzt. It is straight-
forward to compute the Jacobian matrix:
^ kt-k^
, and zt =
J ^ (k, p) ^AkSp(1 - <6) (1 +m) j^ (k) +Af [k, p) A^k
Let D{k) denote the determinant of J as afunction of the steady state capital stock, and r(fc)
denote the trace of J. Then it is easily checked that
D(k) = . (fc) 't>Spi>(k,p) + A^k , „
(1 - ^) (1 +M) - (1 - 0) (1 +p) 4,Sp >
It is therefore easily estaWished that 1+T{k)+D{k)> 0. Use ^(it, p) =(1 - ?S) (1 +^) - Akp' (k)
to obtain
i~T{k) +D(k) =—[1 - e (fc)]
(l-<J)(l + /i)^5/
which is negative if and only if 0(k) <1. This proves that all k' characterized by 0(k') <1are
saddles. The rest is immediate.®
E Proof of Lemma 3
Follows straightforwardly from (32).
F Proof of Proposition 3
Follows straightforwardly from (36). •
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G Proof of Lemma 4
From (36), it follows that
A'dfj,
(p -1) +
dk"
dfi
-
(1.+ fj) -y4m -
2
(48)
Using Proposition 3, it follows that ^ <0holds.-As./x •-* O'and for small enough p, the denomi
nator of (48) remains finite, and the numerator of (48) is,then-clearly negative when p <1 holds.
As fi, the denominator goes to zero' and hence the rest follows.
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k Q.(k)
Figure 1. Steady state equilibria
e(k)<l
e(k)>i
Q(k):g = 0
Q.(k):g>0
Figure 2. Steady state inflation as a function ofthe bonds-money ratio
(Example 1)
7T
1.3
1.25
1.2
1.15
1.05
Figure 3a. Tight money raises inflation under p> 1.
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Figure 3b. Tight money reduces inflation under p < 1.
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Figure 3c. Tight money raises inflation under p
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Figure 4. Steadystate equilibria under strict inflation targeting
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Figure 5. Steady state equilibria under strict inflation targeting (Example 2)
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